But the very nature of the English language conceals how isolating the use of first person plural in law can be. Many languages draw sharp distinctions not known in English. Number in English, limited to singular and plural, includes dual or even trial forms in other languages. An even more striking difference arises from the treatment of first person pronouns and verbs. A significant number of languages distinguish between the inclusive and exclusive forms of the first person plural (and of first person dual and trial, to the extent numbers beyond singular and plural exist in those languages). A more formal articulation of the inclusive/exclusive distinction follows:
First person inclusive includes the speaker and may or may not include a non-speech act participant. Some languages have an "inclusive dual" form, even though dual may not be specified in any other part of the grammar. This form refers only to speaker and hearer and excludes a non-speech act participant. First person exclusive includes the speaker and a non-speech act participant, but excludes the hearer.
FIRST PERSONAL PLURAL
[Vol. ___ defining first person plural as a first-and-second person combination or as a first-andthird person combination. In any language, first person plural (or dual) necessarily requires the speaker to refer to at least one other person besides herself. At an absolute minimum, in a language in which plural number begins with two rather than three (or even four, in those rare languages that contain trial number), first person plural combines the speaker (first person singular) with either second person singular or third person singular. In other words: * First person singular plus second person = inclusive first person plural * First person singular plus third person only = exclusive first person plural
In a language lacking dual number, the inclusive first person plural may include at least one other individual besides the addressee. But the exclusive first person plural (or dual or trial) necessarily excludes the addressee.
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English draws no distinction between the inclusive and exclusive forms of the first person plural. With a single exception, the Marathi language of western India, no Indo-European language draws that distinction. English we, German wir, Swedish vi, Icelandic við, French nous, Spanish nosotros, and Italian noi can either include or exclude the listener.
Outside the Indo-European world, however, the inclusive/exclusive distinction abounds. At least one non-Indo-European language that developed under the strong influence of English as a superstrate langauge contains inclusive and exclusive expressions of first person plural. 4 Tok Pisin, an official language of Papau New Guinea, leverages the syntax of Melanesian languages to transform the English words you, me, and fellow into distinct inclusive (yumi -an amalgam of you and me) and exclusive (mifela -an amalgam of me and fellow) forms of the firstperson plural pronoun. Tok Pisin's morphological similarity to English creates an informal mnemonic by which native speakers of English can remember the otherwise exotic phenomenon of inclusive and exclusive first person plural pronouns: yumi designates inclusive first person, while mifela designates exclusive first person. In the woeful but workable tradition of travel guide phonology, youme and me-fellow will do.
The broader family of Austronesian languages (which includes Melanesian languages) exhibits the inclusive-exclusive distinction on a nearly universal basis.
Malay and Indonesian distinguish between the inclusive pronoun kita and the exclusive pronoun kami. By saying "We (kami) will go shopping, and then we (kita) will eat," a host can clearly communicate that his guest should not accompany him to the market, but that the guest is invited to dinner. Likewise, Tagalog boasts kamí and táyo as its exclusive and inclusive forms of the first person plural.
The Samoan language, another member of the Austronesian family, displays an intriguing variation on this theme.
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Like Malay and Tagalog, Samoan has two separate roots for we: inclusive 'ita and exclusive 'ima. Samoan then combines those roots with the dual suffix -'ua or the plural suffix -tou to form a full complement of dual and plural pronouns meaning we, you all, and they:
The inclusive pronoun 'ita may be used on its own as a singular pronoun. 'Ita means I, but in a sense that implicitly asks the listener's indulgence for the speaker's emotional involvement in the subject. By using 'ita instead of a'u, a Samoan speaker effectively involves her addressee in statements about herself. The Sino-Tibetan language family also plays with the inclusive/exclusive distinction, albeit inconsistently. Standard Mandarin uses the pronoun wǒmen 我們 (we), the plural of the pronoun wǒ 我 (I), in an indefinite fashion comparable to the way English speakers use we. Northern dialects of Mandarin, however, adopt an additional pronoun, zámen 咱們, which is inclusive, and retains wǒmen 我們 to denote we in its exclusive sense. Taiwanese accomplishes a similar feat by manipulating the enclitic -n, which indicates plural number in pronouns. The exclusive pronoun goán is the plural of goá (I), whereas the inclusive pronoun lán combines the plural suffix -n with a root influenced by lí (you). For a native speaker of Taiwanese who hopes to be included within a conversational strand, goán is the loneliest pronoun. sake, the Japanese loanword ハーンバガ must be pronounced haambaga rather than haanbaga, even though the katakana character ン ordinarily designates the phoneme n.
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The Cherokee language, rightly renowned as the only Amerind language with its own writing system and the only language anywhere whose writing system is the work of a single individual, 9 also boasts a highly elaborate and expressive set of pronouns. Linguist Steven Pinker admires how "the complex Cherokee pronoun system" provides distinct forms for "'you and I,' 'another person and I,' 'several other people and I,' and 'you, one or more other persons and I,' which English crudely collapses into the all-purpose pronoun we." contains three numbers -singular, dual, and plural -but also distinguishes between the inclusive and exclusive forms of the first person dual and plural.
Within North America, Cherokee is hardly alone in distinguishing between exclusive and inclusive first person plural. (Cherokee is lonely in the sense that it is the last extant Southern Iroquoian language.) All Algonquian languages draw this distinction. In Shawnee, for instance, the exclusive first person plural pronoun is niilawe, and the inclusive first person plural pronoun is kiilawe, by obvious analogy to the first person singular pronoun niila and the second person singular pronoun kiila. All Algonquian languages also draw the inclusive/exclusive distinction in the pronominal inflection of their verbs. Although use or nonuse of the distinction follows no discernible pattern in New World languages, distinct pronouns indicating inclusive versus exclusive first person plural appear in South American languages such as Quecha and Guaraní. From Austronesia to the Andes, many of the languages of the greater Pacific rim take care to distinguish the inclusive from the exclusive use of the first person plural. By contrast, nearly the entire Indo-European family, at least west of Maharashtra (the heart of the Marathi-speaking population), pays no heed and adopts undifferentiated first person plural pronouns. What light, if any, does this global linguistic divide shed upon the project of legal interpretation, especially constitutional interpretation, in a country that leads the world in absorbing newcomers and in projecting its values -by force, by market power, or by sheer, mere numbers -across the globe?
At an absolute minimum, in a constitutional system whose highest court has exhibited increasing willingness to consult foreign precedent, 11 the American constitutional tradition has begun to transcend the relatively narrow cultural and linguistic confines of the "English-speaking peoples." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) ("[A] process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no means follows, that nothing else can be due process of law.").
[Vol. ___ Court has never conclusively adjudicated the constitutionality of legislation declaring English to be the official language of a state, 13 Congress has (with the Supreme Court's apparent blessing), prohibited the states from treating proficiency in English as a precondition to the franchise.
14 It also appears that failing to provide adequate education to children whose native language is not English violates Title VI, 15 even if federal law gives individual families no power to enforce this provision through private lawsuits.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that a prosecutor's motivation "for excusing . . . jurors related to their ability to speak and understand Spanish [might] raise a plausible, though not a necessary, inference that language might be a pretext for what in fact were race-based peremptory challenges." 17 And the right to teach and learn languages other than English, sanctified as a substantive expression of due process nearly a century ago, remains the law of the land. 18 On the other hand, the United States has achieved a far more mixed legal legacy among native speakers of languages that draw the inclusive/exclusive distinction. In one of its first cases interpreting the nativist immigration laws of the 1920s, the Supreme Court held that persons of Japanese descent (and presumably those originating from other east Asian countries) could not attain citizenship under an immigration statute limiting naturalization to "free white persons" and "persons of African nativity or descent."
19 The Court then extended that holding to persons of Asian Indian descent.
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By contrast, with respect to the Philippines, the site of one of the United States' more regrettable colonial misadventures, the Supreme Court did invalidate a territorial law that effectively prohibited the recording of financial accounts in Chinese. 21 Finally, the long and often unhappy interaction between American constitutional law and the native peoples of North America has often contested the degree to which the "the Courts of the conqueror" may and should stay the hand of cultural extermination.
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At its best, the Supreme Court has "perceive [d] plainly that the constitution . . . does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term 'foreign nations;' not we presume, because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States."
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It is safe to say that the long project of "domesticating" Indian law -that of fully incorporating the United States' obligations to native America into the Constitution and the American constitutional tradition -remains a work in progress. 24 In the meanwhile, the prevalence of the inclusive/exclusive distinction among so many languages that have contributed to the linguistic and cultural mosaic of the United States answers the lingering question: Whom does American constitutional law address and include when its foundational documents and central interpretive institution speak in the first person plural? When the Declaration of Independence "hold[s] these truths to be self-evident," it is amply clear that the we of the Declaration's second sentence excludes the intended audience -the great European powers that might otherwise have intervened on behalf of the British crown's effort to retain its colonies in North America. The Supreme Court's ubiquitous we falls even more squarely on the exclusive side of the yumi/mifela divide within first person plural.
The final -and by far the most important -piece of contested linguistic turf is therefore the opening sentence, even the first word, of the Constitution itself.
Who exactly belongs within the phrase, We the People? Who constituted the audience that the document's framers intended to address? As a matter of original intent, the idea of an inclusive We the People seems remote, and sadly so. On his careful reading of the document as a whole and the early tradition that it inspired, Justice Thurgood Marshall suggested that the Constitution's framers intended no such thing as comprehensive inclusion: "In their declaration of the principles that were to provide the cornerstone of the new Nation, therefore, the Framers made it plain that "we the people," for whose protection the Constitution was designed, did not include those whose skins were the wrong color." REV. 381 (1993) . 24 See generally Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31 (1996) .
[Vol. ___ are not, and any constitutional tradition worth protecting is a living tradition.
What shall we Americans ultimately make of first person plural within this nation's constitutional tradition? Too doleful a sentiment scarcely befits a constitutional tradition that increasingly tests itself by global standards. 26 Every nation displays a tablet of its virtues (and its vices) through its fundamental law. The United States is no exception. Within the American civic religion called constitutional law, 27 the possibility of ongoing change and eventual redemption reigns supreme. Nothing lies beyond reform and salvation -nothing, that is, except the past. 28 To lament that "[t]he harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved," therefore seems downright un-American. 
